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I. INTRODUCTION 
In January 2008, the United States Supreme Court issued a 
unanimous decision which held that investment advisory fees paid by 
a trust may not be deducted in full for income tax purposes.1  The 
 
       †  J.D. Candidate 2011, William Mitchell College of Law; B.A., Political Science, 
University of Minnesota—Duluth, 2005. For more than three years the author has 
worked as a Trust Officer in Wells Fargo’s Wealth Management Group. He would like 
to thank Sara for her continuing patience and support throughout his law school 
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1334 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:3 
previous sentence may prompt 95% of readers to put this case note 
down and continue on with their business.  Admittedly, tax law—
specifically, income tax law as it pertains to trusts and estates—is not 
the sexiest topic.  The outcome of this seemingly mundane topic, 
however, has multi-million dollar consequences for both the 
government and those who rely on trusts for income.  There are 
nearly four million estates and trusts that outsource roughly $10.2 
billion a year for legal, accounting, tax reporting and asset 
management services.2  In addition to these expenses these trusts and 
estates also pay trustees an additional $4 billion for their asset-
management services.3  Needless to say, the tax revenue to be gained 
by the government and the income to be lost for beneficiaries are 
substantial and warrant attention from even non-tax professionals. 
This case note will first provide a brief statutory history of 
Internal Revenue Code Section 67 and a basic outline of how the 
federal income tax is calculated.4  It will then provide a brief synopsis 
of the jurisdictional split as to the deductibility issues among federal 
circuit courts of appeals.5  It will proceed with a discussion of both the 
factual6 and procedural7 setting of the Knight decision in addition to 
the proposed regulations set forth by the Department of the Treasury 
(Treasury).8  This discussion will be followed by the Supreme Court’s 
holding based on those facts9 and will conclude with an analysis of the 
opinion10 and the Treasury’s proposed regulations.11  The purpose of 
this note is to evaluate the practical effects of both the current 
proposed regulations to section 67(e) and the possible amendments 
to these proposed regulations in light of the Supreme Court’s holding 
in Knight.  
  
 
experience.  He would also like to thank his parents for their support over the years 
and the William Mitchell Law Review staff for their efforts in preparing this article for 
publication.  
 1. Knight v. Comm’r, 552 U.S. 181 (2008).  
 2. Tom Herman, Trust-Fees Ruling Causes Pain – Justices Decision Limits Deductions 
for Tax Purposes, WALL ST. J., Jan. 23, 2008, at D6. 
 3. Id. (citing Eileen Sher, a tax technical manager at the American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants in Washington).  
 4. See infra, Part II(A). 
 5. See infra, Part II(B). 
 6. See infra, Part III(A).  
 7. See infra, Part III(B).  
 8. See infra, Part III(C). 
 9. See infra, Part IV.  
 10. See infra, Part V(A).  
 11. See infra, Part V(B). 
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II. HISTORY 
A. Statutory Background  
Section 1 of the Internal Revenue Code (the Code) imposes a tax 
on all “taxable income” of both individuals and trusts.12  In order to 
calculate taxable income, a taxpayer must first determine the amount 
of his or her “gross income.”13  Gross income is defined as “all 
income from whatever source derived.”14  “Adjusted gross income” is 
then determined by subtracting from gross income certain “above-
the-line” deductions, such as trade and business expenses.15  “Taxable 
income” is then calculated by subtracting “itemized deductions” —
also known as “below-the-line” deductions—from the taxpayer’s 
adjusted gross income.16   
Prior to the passage of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, below-the-
line deductions were fully deductible from a taxpayer’s adjusted gross 
income.17  Complexities and inefficiencies arose out of this system for 
both the taxpayers and the IRS.18  Taxpayers were required to keep 
extensive records of their common expenditures which in turn caused 
“significant administrative and enforcement problems for the 
[IRS].”19  This complexity and the correlating potential for abuse led 
Congress to enact what is commonly referred to as the “2% floor” by 
adding section 67 to the Code.20   
Section 67(a) states that “the miscellaneous itemized deductions 
for any taxable year shall be allowed only to the extent that the 
aggregate of such deductions exceeds 2 percent of adjusted gross 
income.”21  Section 67(b) then goes on to exempt from the 2% floor 
 
 12. I.R.C. § 1(a)-(e) (2010).  
 13. William L. Rudkin Testamentary Trust v. Comm’r, 467 F.3d 149, 152 (2d Cir. 
2006). 
 14. I.R.C. § 61(a) (2010). “Except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, gross 
income means all income from whatever source derived . . . .” Id.  
 15. I.R.C. § 62(a) (2010). Section 62(a) outlines twenty deductions that may be 
subtracted from a taxpayer’s gross income to reach his or her adjusted gross income. 
Id.  
 16. I.R.C. § 63 (2010).  
 17. Knight v. Comm’r, 552 U.S. 181, 184 (2008).   
 18. Id.  
 19. Id. (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 99-426, at 109 (1985)).  
 20. Id.  
 21. I.R.C. § 67(a) (2010).  “The utility of itemized deductions generally depends 
upon whether in the aggregate (after a 2 percent floor imposed on some itemized 
deductions and a reduction in most itemized deductions of high-income taxpayers) 
they exceed the ‘standard deduction.’”  JAMES J. FREELAND ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF 
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 575 (Foundation Press 2009) (1972).  The standard 
3
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certain specifically enumerated itemized deductions.22  Investment 
advisory fees are typically treated as itemized deductions under 
Section 212.23  However, because they are not listed in section 67(b), 
these fees are subject to the 2% floor established by section 67(a).24   
Section 67(e) extends the application of the 2% floor to the 
miscellaneous itemized deductions of trusts and estates with one 
exception relevant to this particular case note.25  A trust’s costs are 
deductible in full (not subject to the 2% floor) “if they satisfy both of 
the following two requirements: (1) they are ‘paid or incurred in 
connection with the administration of the . . . trust’; and (2) they 
‘would not have been incurred if the property were not held in such 
trust.’”26   
B. Jurisdictional Splits27 
 
deduction came into the Code in 1944 as a way to ease the burden of administration. 
Id.  If a taxpayer’s itemized deductions did not surpass the 2% floor of section 67, or 
if he simply chose not to itemize his deductions, the taxpayer could punt and claim 
the standard deduction.  Id.  The standard deduction was seen to ease the burden of 
both the taxpayer and the IRS.  Id. at 574-77.   
 22. William L. Rudkin Testamentary Trust v. Comm’r, 467 F.3d 149, 153 (2006). 
 23. Id. See also I.R.C. § 212 (2010).  Section 212 allows for a deduction of “all the 
ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year (1) for the 
production or collection of income; (2) for the management, conservation or 
maintenance of property held for the production of income . . . .” Id.  
 24. Rudkin Testamentary Trust, 467 F.3d at 153.  See also Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.67-
1T(a)(1)(ii) (1988) (stating that investment advisory fees are subject to the 2% floor 
of § 67(a)).  
 25. I.R.C. § 67(e) (2010).  
 26. Rudkin Testamentary Trust, 467 F.3d at 151 (quoting I.R.C. § 67(e)).  
 27. The three cases that follow in this section highlight an interesting aspect of 
federal income tax law; namely that there are three separate routes in which a 
taxpayer may litigate an income tax deficiency controversy.  JAMES J. FREELAND ET AL., 
supra note 21, at 968.  The first route is through the Tax Court.  A taxpayer, without 
actually paying the claimed tax deficiency, may file a petition in Tax Court.  If the Tax 
Court affirms the Commissioner’s claimed deficiency, the taxpayer may then file an 
appeal with the United States Court of Appeals in the circuit in which he or she 
resides.  If the taxpayer wishes to forgo any possible administrative remedies available 
to him under the Tax Court route, he may choose to pay the deficiency in full and file 
a claim in federal district court for an income tax refund.  Any appeal from the 
district court would go to the appeals circuit in which he or she resides.  The last 
route is through the United States Court of Federal Claims.  Like the federal district 
court route, a taxpayer must pay the claimed deficiency in full prior to initiating a suit 
in the Court of Federal Claims.  Unlike the district court route, there is no jury trial 
available in this forum and its organization and procedures are very similar to that of 
the Tax Court.  Any appeal from this court goes to the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit.  There are numerous tactical reasons a taxpayer may choose 
one forum over another, however, if a taxpayer chooses to pay less than the deficiency 
4
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1. The Sixth Circuit: O’Neill v. Commissioner  
The first fully litigated case on the issue of the deductibility of 
trust or estate investment advisory fees was O’Neill v. Commissioner.28  
For the 1987 taxable year, the first year in which the 2% floor was in 
effect, the co-trustees of the William J. O’Neill, Jr. Irrevocable Trust 
(the O’Neill Trust) deducted, in full, $15,374 of investment advisory 
fees incurred by the trust.29  The Commissioner of the Internal 
Revenue Service subsequently issued a Notice of Deficiency for $3534 
in tax owed by the trust finding that the investment advisory fees 
constituted a “miscellaneous itemized deduction” under section 
67(a).30 
Following the filing of a petition for redetermination, the Tax 
Court upheld the Commissioner’s position and found that the 
investment advisory fees were not described in section 67(e)(1) and 
were, therefore, subject to the 2% floor.31  The Tax Court stated that 
“the thrust of the language of section 67(e) is that only those costs 
which are unique to the administration of an estate or trust are to be 
deducted from gross income without being subject to the 2-percent 
floor on itemized deductions set forth at section 67(a).”32  
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 
reversed.33  It based its reasoning on a fiduciary’s responsibility to 
invest and manage trust assets as a “prudent investor” would manage 
his own assets.34  The Sixth Circuit found that where a trustee lacks 
experience in investment matters, his fiduciary duties require him to 
retain the services of an investment advisor so as not to put the trust 
assets at risk.35  Because the investment advisory fees were caused by 
 
asserted, the taxpayer’s only remedy is a deficiency proceeding in the Tax Court.  Id. 
 28. 994 F.2d 302 (6th Cir. 1993), abrogated by Knight v. Comm’r, 552 U.S. 181 
(2008).  
 29. Id. at 303.  In 1987, the market value of the O’Neill Trust exceeded $4.5 
million.  Id.  From 1979 to 1991, the co-trustees had engaged Hamilton & Allen (f.k.a. 
Allen & Leavy Investment Management, Inc.) to provide investment management 
services for the O’Neill Trust.  Id.  
 30. Id.  The result of the Commissioner’s findings increased the O’Neill Trust’s 
taxable income by $9180.  Id.   
 31. Id. at 304.  
 32. Id.(quotations omitted).  
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 304. 
 35. Id.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS: PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE § 227 
reporter’s notes (1990) (“The prudent investor rule of this Section has its origins in 
the dictum of Harvard College v. Amory, 9 Pick. (26 Mass) 446, 461 (1830), stating that 
trustees must ‘observe how men of prudence, discretion, and intelligence manage 
their own affairs, not in regard to speculation, but in regard to the permanent 
5
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the fiduciary duties of the co-trustees, the Sixth Circuit found that the 
fees were incurred in connection with the administration of the trust 
and were, therefore, fully deductible and not subject to the 2% floor 
of section 67(a).36   
Subsequent to the ruling of the Sixth Circuit, the IRS 
nonacquiesced but opted not to seek certiorari due to the lack of 
conflict among the circuit courts of appeals.37  The IRS did, however, 
encourage parties in other circuits to follow the Tax Court’s opinion 
in hopes of developing inter-circuit conflict.38  The IRS would soon 
get their wish as the O’Neill opinion marked the first—and last—time 
that a circuit court would agree with the taxpayer’s position on the 
deductibility of investment advisory fees by trusts.39  In 2000, the Court 
of Federal Claims agreed with the IRS’s position.40 
2. The Federal Circuit: Mellon Bank v. United States  
In the years 1989 through 1992, Mellon Bank filed fiduciary 
income tax returns for thirteen trusts created for the benefit of 
members of the Richard K. Mellon family.41  In each of these years 
Mellon Bank applied the 2% floor to the investment management 
fees incurred by the trusts.42  Relying on O’Neill v. Commissioner of 
Internal Revenue,43 in October 1993, Mellon bank filed an amended 
fiduciary income tax return seeking a consolidated tax refund of 
income taxes paid in years 1989 through 1992.44  The IRS denied the 
 
disposition of their funds, considering the probable income, as well as the probable 
safety of the capital to be invested.’”).  
 36. O’Neill, 994 F.2d at 304.  This line of reasoning would later be put forth by 
the trustee in Knight v. Commissioner and be referred to as the “straightforward 
causation test.”  Knight v. Comm’r, 552 U.S. 181, 189 (2008). 
 37. O’Neill, 994 F.2d 302, action on dec., 1994-06 (Sept. 12, 1994) (providing 
direction as to how taxpayers should approach this decision: “[t]he Service agrees 
with the Tax Court and disagrees with the Sixth Circuit.  No petition for a writ of 
certiorari was filed, however, in the absence of intercircuit conflict.  Deductions for 
fees for investment advice incurred by trusts or estates should continue to be subject 
to the 2[%] floor in section 67 outside the Sixth Circuit.  While the Sixth Circuit’s 
decision should be followed there, the Tax Court opinion should be followed in other 
circuits in hope of developing intercircuit conflict.”).  
 38. Id.  
 39. Philip N. Jones, Supreme Court Rules—Negatively—on Deductibility of Trust 
Investment Advisor Fees, 108 J. TAX’N 72, 73 (2008).  
 40. Id.  
 41. Mellon Bank v. United States, 265 F.3d 1275, 1277 (Fed. Cir. 2001).  
 42. Jones, supra note 39, at 73.  
 43. 994 F.2d 302 (6th Cir.1993), abrogated by Knight v. Comm’r, 552 U.S. 181 
(2008). 
 44. Mellon, 265 F.3d at 1278.  
6
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refund claim, and the bank filed suit in the Court of Federal Claims.45  
After the submission of stipulated facts,46 the trial court entered 
judgment on the merits in favor of the United States.47  Taking issue 
with the trial court’s construction of the statute, Mellon Bank 
appealed.48   
It was undisputed that trustee fees are fully deductible.49  Mellon 
Bank maintained that the “trustee fees are merely a label for fiduciary 
services performed by the trustee.”50  It argued that because these 
fiduciary services are required by law, any services that are delegated 
by the trustee—specifically, investment advisory fees—would remain 
subject to fiduciary standards and are, therefore, trustee fees fully 
deductible under section 67(e)(1).51   
The question addressed by the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Federal Circuit was whether the Court of Federal Claims, in 
rejecting Mellon Bank’s interpretation, properly interpreted the 
second requirement of section 67(e)(1) to mean that a trustee’s costs 
are subject to the 2% floor established by section 67(a) unless the 
costs occur only in the context of trust administration and are not 
routinely incurred by individual investors.52  The Federal Circuit found 
that that it had and affirmed.53   
In doing so, the Federal Circuit looked closely at the two-pronged 
test of section 67(e)(1).54  The first prong of the test states that fees 
are fully deductible if they are “costs which are paid or incurred in 
connection with the administration of the estate or trust.”55  The 
court stated that this prong serves as a prerequisite which defines the 
relationship between the costs and the administration of the trust.56  It 
 
 45. Id.  Following the initiation of the suit in the Court of Federal Claims, both 
parties filed motions for summary judgment.  Id.  Both motions were subsequently 
denied by the court.  Id.  The court denied the government’s motion because they 
found that there were material issues of fact as to whether certain expenditures 
deducted by the bank would not have been incurred if the property were not held in 
a trust.  Id.  The court rejected Mellon Bank’s interpretation of section 67(e)(1) and 
therefore denied its motion.  Id.   
 46. Id.  
 47. Id.    
 48. Id.  
 49. Id. at 1279. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 1281–82. 
 54. Id. at 1280–81. 
 55. I.R.C. § 67(e)(1) (2010).  
 56. Mellon, 265 F.3d at 1280. 
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logically follows that all expenses resulting from the fiduciary 
obligations of the trustee satisfy this prerequisite.57  It is at this point 
that the court rejected Mellon Bank’s interpretation.  Under the 
bank’s interpretation, this is where the analysis would stop because 
the bank argues that trustee fees are merely a label for fiduciary 
costs.58  Therefore all expenses incurred by a trustee in connection 
with the administration of a trust would be fully deductible.59  This 
interpretation, however, would eliminate the second prong of section 
67(e)(1), which is directed to the question of whether an expense 
would not have been incurred if the property had not been held in 
trust.60 
The court refused to adopt Mellon Bank’s interpretation because 
it would render the second prong of section 67(e)(1) superfluous.61  
Instead it found that the second prong served as a filter that allowed a 
full deduction only if such fees were costs that “would not have been 
incurred if the property were not held in such trust or estate.”62  This 
requirement did not focus on the “relationship between the trust and 
costs, but the type of costs, and whether those costs would have been 
incurred” had the assets been held outside of a trust.63  The second 
prong, therefore, “treats as fully deductible only those trust-related 
administrative expenses that are unique to the administration of a trust 
and not customarily incurred outside of trusts.”64  Investment advisory 
fees, the court found, are commonly incurred outside of trusts and 
are therefore not exempt under section 67(e)(1) and are subject to 
the 2% floor of section 67(a).65 
 
 57. Id.    
 58. Id. at 1279. 
 59. Id. at 1280. 
 60. I.R.C. § 67(e)(1) (2010). 
 61. Id.  “Our interpretation, however, must give full effect to the entire statute, 
not merely the first clause.” Mellon, 265 F.3d at 1280 (citing Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 
U.S. 57, 62 (1998) (“[W]e are hesitant to adopt an interpretation of a congressional 
enactment which renders superfluous another portion of that same law.”)).  
 62. Mellon, 265 F.3d at 1280. 
 63. Id. at 1281.  
 64. Id (emphasis added). 
 65. Id.  In the last paragraph of its opinion, the Federal Circuit noted that 
Mellon Bank “had chosen to retain an outside investment advisor,” and thus they 
“must accept the tax consequences of that decision.” Jones, supra note 39, at 73.  This 
comment seems to imply “that the bank’s fees would have been fully deductible had 
the bank bundled all of its fees into a single trustee’s fee.”  Id.  
8
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3. The Fourth Circuit: Scott v. United States66 
On October 16, 1944, the Bryan Trust was established under the 
last will and testament of John Stewart Bryan.67  The Bryan Trust was 
established for the benefit of John Bryan’s four granddaughters.68  
The Trust authorized its trustees to employ investment advisors and to 
pay those advisors reasonable fees for their services.69  Consistent with 
this authorization, the trustees of the Bryan Trust, three attorneys,70 
retained the investment-counseling firm of Brundage, Sotry and Rose, 
LLC (Brundage).71  During the tax years at issue in this case, 1996 and 
1997, the Bryan Trust held assets worth approximately $25 million.  In 
1996 and 1997, respectively, the Trust paid Brundage $107,055 and 
$119,943 in investment advisory fees.72  In addition to the investment 
advisory fees, “the Trust also paid custodian fees, trustees’ fees, and 
fees for the preparation of [fiduciary] income tax returns and 
accountings.” 73   
On both the 1996 and 1997 fiduciary income tax returns, the 
taxpayers reported the investment advisory fees paid to Brundage as 
“‘other deductions,’ not subject to the 2% floor for miscellaneous 
itemized deductions.”74  Following an audit, the “IRS determined that 
the investment . . . [advisory] fees were . . . miscellaneous itemized de-
ductions subject to the 2% floor” and issued a notice of deficiency.75  
In 2000, the taxpayers paid the deficiency and, after their refund 
claim was denied by the IRS, filed a refund suit in Federal District 
Court.76   
The Government filed a motion for summary judgment relying 
on the Federal Circuit’s decision in Mellon Bank.77  The taxpayers then 
filed a cross motion for summary judgment relying on the Sixth 
 
 66. Scott v. United States, 328 F.3d 132 (4th Cir. 2003). 
 67. Id. at 135.  The Trust was established under Virginia law.  Id.  
 68. Id.  “These granddaughters include[d] taxpayers Shelah K. Scott, Hope S. 
Childs, and Anne K. McGuire.”  Id.   
 69. Id.   
 70. Id. at 136.  The income beneficiaries of the trust all claimed that the trustees 
all lacked expertise in the investment of large sums of money and would not have 
served without an outside investment advisor. Id.   
 71. Id. at 135.  
 72. Id. at 136. 
 73. Id.   
 74. Id. 
 75. Id.   
 76. Id.  The taxpayers each filed their own refund suits in the Eastern District of 
Virginia.  These suits were consolidated immediately after they were filed.  Id. 
 77. Id. 
9
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Circuit’s decision in O’Neill.78  “At oral argument on the motions, the 
court raised a new issue” regarding the immunity Virginia law79 
“afforded . . . to trustees who invest trust assets in a statutory list of 
approved investments.”80  “After further briefing and argument” on 
this statutory immunity issue, “the court granted the Government’s 
motion for summary judgment.”81  The court reasoned that because 
trustees had access to this list of investments, and would be immune 
from liability for any losses or damages if these investments were used, 
an investment advisor was not required.82  Because retaining an 
investment advisor to manage the trust assets was not required under 
the trustees’ fiduciary duty, the court found the associated fees to be 
subject to the 2% floor of section 67(a).83  
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the trial court’s ruling 
but on different grounds.84  Rather than relying on Virginia law,85 the 
court focused on the commonality in which investment advisory fees 
are incurred by individuals and trusts.86  Relying on Mellon Bank, the 
court stated simply that “trust-related administrative expenses are 
subject to the 2% floor if they constitute expenses commonly incurred 
by individual taxpayers.” 87  Because investment advisory fees are 
commonly incurred outside the context of trust administration, they 
are, therefore, subject to the 2% floor.88  The court also noted what it 
 
 78. Id. 
 79. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 26-45.3, 45.14 (2009). 
 80. Scott, 328 F.3d at 136.  “The court sought additional briefing on the potential 
impact of that immunity on the deductibility of investment-advice fees.”  Id.  
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 137.  
 83. Id.  “The [district] court acknowledged that investments authorized by the 
Virginia legal list might not be the best investments from a financial perspective and 
that trustees ‘would probably be better served’ by seeking investment advice.”  Id.  
 84. Id. at 140.  
 85. The Fourth Circuit was right to base its decision on other grounds.  Basing 
the outcome of a federal income tax question on state law, when not expressly 
authorized, runs contrary to settled precedent.  See Lyeth v. Hoey, 305 U.S. 188, 194 
(1938) (“In dealing with the meaning and application of an act of Congress enacted 
in the exercise of its plenary power under the Constitution to tax income . . . it is the 
will of Congress which controls, and the expression of its will, in the absence of 
language evidencing a different purpose, should be interpreted so as to give a 
uniform application to a nationwide scheme of taxation. . . . Congress establishes its 
own criteria and the state law may control only when the federal taxing act by express 
language or necessary implication makes its operation dependent upon state 
law.”)(internal quotations omitted). 
 86. Scott, 328 F.3d at 140. 
 87. Id.  
 88. Id.   
10
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saw as a “fatal flaw” of the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning in O’Neill.89  The 
test was not whether such costs were commonly incurred by trustees, 
but rather whether such costs were commonly incurred outside of 
trusts.90  The score was, therefore, two circuits to one in favor of the 
IRS. 
III. THE KNIGHT FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY  
A. The Rudkin (Knight) Facts 
Michael J. Knight (Knight) served as trustee of the William L. 
Rudkin Testamentary Trust (trust) established in Connecticut under 
the will of Henry A. Rudkin on April 14, 1967.91  The trust was initially 
funded with proceeds from the sale of Pepperidge Farm to Campbell 
Soup Company.92  The trustees and other fiduciaries were provided 
with broad authority in the management of the trust property.93  The 
trust authorized the trustees “to employ such agents, experts and 
counsel as they may deem advisable in connection with the 
administration and management of [the] estate and of any trust 
created [thereunder].”94 
In 2000, Knight engaged Warfield Associates, Inc. (Warfield) to 
provide investment management advice for the trust,95 which, at the 
beginning of the tax year, held approximately $2.9 million in 
marketable securities.96  On its Form 1041, U.S. Income Tax Return 
for Estates and Trusts, for the year 2000, the trust reported total 
income of $624,816.97  The fiduciary income tax return also reported, 
among other things, a deduction of the Warfield investment 
management fees totaling $22,241.98  This deduction was taken on 
 
 89. Id.  
 90. Id.; see also Jones, supra note 39, at 74.  
 91. William L. Rudkin Testamentary Trust v. Comm’r, 467 F.3d 149, 151 (2d Cir. 
2006).  
 92. Id.  Henry A. Rudkin’s family was involved in the founding of Pepperidge 
Farm.  Rudkin Testamentary Trust v. Comm’r, 124 T.C. 304, 305 (2005).  Pepperidge 
Farm was acquired by Campbell Soup Company in 1961.  Pepperidge Farm: Our 
History, http://www.pepperidgefarm.com/history.aspx (last visited Apr. 10, 2010).  
 93. Rudkin, 124 T.C. at 305.  
 94. Id. at 306.  
 95. Id. 
 96. Knight v. Comm’r, 552 U.S. 181, 185 (2008).   
 97. Rudkin, 124 T.C. at 306.  The Form 1041 for the 2000 year was timely filed on 
behalf of the trust.  Id.  
 98. Id.  
11
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line 15a for “[o]ther deductions not subject to the 2% floor.”99  There 
was no deduction claimed on line 15b for “[a]llowable miscellaneous 
itemized deductions subject to the 2% floor.”100   
On December 5, 2003, the Commissioner of the IRS 
(Commissioner) issued to the trust a statutory notice of deficiency for 
the taxable year 2000.101  The notice of deficiency indicated that it 
rejected the trust’s itemized deduction for the investment advisory 
fees in the amount of $22,241.102  Instead, the Commissioner allowed 
deduction of the portion of the fees that exceeded 2% of the adjusted 
gross income of $623,050.103  The amount found by the IRS to be in 
excess of the 2% floor was $9780.104  The corresponding income tax 
deficiency amounted to $4448.105  The trust subsequently filed a 
petition in Tax Court disputing the assessed deficiency.  
B. Tax Court & Second Circuit Opinions: Rudkin v. Commissioner   
In its petition to the Tax Court, the trustee argued that the fees 
were paid in connection with administration of the trust and would 
not have been incurred if the property were not held in trust.106  Like 
the trustees in Mellon Bank, the trustees argued that even though an 
individual may make a voluntary choice to engage an investment 
advisor, “fiduciary duties render such professional advice a necessary 
and ‘involuntary’ component of trust administration.”107 The 
involuntary nature of retaining an investment advisor to manage the 
trust assets, the trustees claimed, arose out of their obligation to act as 
a “prudent investor” under the Connecticut Uniform Prudent 
Investor Act,108 which required the trustee to obtain investment 
 
 99. Id.  
 100. Id. 
 101. Id.  The Internal Revenue Service must assess any amount of alleged 
underpayment of tax within three years after a taxpayer files the taxpayer’s return for 
a year.  JAMES J. FREELAND ET AL., supra note 21, at 984.  
 102. Rudkin, 467 F.3d at 306.  
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id.  Following the notice of deficiency, both parties became aware that the 
notice contained an error in its calculation of the trust’s adjusted gross income.  Id.  It 
was then stipulated that the correct amount was $613,263, and, therefore, the 
corresponding deduction for the investment management advisory fees would be 
$9976.  Id.   “However, on account of the alternative minimum tax, the parties are in 
further agreement that the resultant deficiency if respondent’s position is sustained 
remains unchanged at $4,448.”  Rudkin v. Comm’r, 124 T.C. 304, 306 (2005). 
 106. Rudkin, 124 T.C. at 308.  
 107. Id.  
 108. The legal duty of prudence has been codified in the Uniform Prudent 
12
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advisory services, and, therefore, pay investment advisory fees.109   
The trustee took the position that the exception in section 67(e) 
“establishes a straightforward causation test.”110  The proper inquiry, 
the trustee argued, is whether a particular expense of a trust or estate 
was caused by the fact that the property was held in the trust or 
estate.111  The investment advisory fees incurred by the trust, 
therefore, met this test as “these costs [were] caused by the trustee’s 
obligation to obtain advice on investing trust assets in compliance 
 
Investor Act in 1994.  See UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT §§ 1-16, 7B U.L.A. 1 (2006);  see 
also Brief of Am. Bankers Ass’n et. al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Knight v. 
Comm’r, 581 U.S. 181 (2007) (No. 06-1286).  Since 1994, versions of this uniform 
statute have been adopted by a majority of states and the District of Columbia as the 
standard for trust investment law.  See ALASKA STAT. §§ 13.36.225–.260 (2008); ARIZ. 
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-10901 to -10909 (Supp. 2009); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 24-2-610 to 
-619 (Supp. 2009); CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 16045–16054 (West Supp. 2010); COLO. REV. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 15-1.1-101 to -115 (West 2005 & Supp. 2009); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 45a-541 to -541l (West 2004 & Supp. 2009); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 19-1309.01–.06 
(LexisNexis 2005); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 518.11 (West 2007 & Supp. 2010); HAW. REV. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 554C-1 to -12 (LexisNexis 2006 & Supp. 2009); IDAHO CODE ANN. 
§§ 68-501 to -514 (2006); 760 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5, 5/5.1 (West 2007 & Supp. 
2009); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 30-4-3.5-1 to -13 (West 2009); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 633.4301–
.4309 (West 2003 & Supp. 2009); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 58-24a01 to -24a19 (2006); ME. 
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-B, §§ 901– 908 (West Supp. 2009); MD. CODE ANN. 
§§ 14-405(c), 15-114(b)(LexisNexis 2001 & Supp. 2009); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 
203C, §§ 1–11 (West 2004 & Supp. 2009); MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 700.1501–.1512 (West 
2002 & Supp. 2009); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 501B.151–.152 (West 2009 & Supp. 2010); 
MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 469.900–.913 (West 2001); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-34-601 to -610 
(2009); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 30-3883 to -3889 (LexisNexis Supp. 2009); N.Y. EST. 
POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 11-2.3 (McKinney 2008 & Supp. 2010); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 164.705–.775 (LexisNexis 2009); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 564-B:9-901 to -906 
(LexisNexis 2006 & Supp. 2009); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 3B:20-11.1–.12 (West Supp. 
2009); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-7-601 to -612 (West 2004 & Supp. 2009); N.C. GEN. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 36C-9-901 to -907 (2009); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 59-02-08.1–.11 (2004); OHIO 
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 5809.01–.08 (West 2007 & Supp. 2009); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, 
§§ 175.60–.72 (West Supp. 2010); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 130.750–.755 (West Supp. 2009); 
20 PA. CONS. STA. ANN. §§ 7201–7214 (West 2005 & Supp. 2009); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 18-
15-1 to -13 (West, Westlaw through 2006 Sess.); S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-7-933 (2009); S.D. 
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 55-5-6 to -16 (2004 & Supp. 2009); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 35-14-
101 to -114 (West 2007); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 117.001–.012 (Vernon 2007 & 
Supp. 2009); UTAH CODE. ANN. §§ 75-7-901 to -907 (West Supp. 2009); VA. CODE ANN. 
§§ 26-45.3–.14 (2009); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 11.100.010–.140 (West 2006 & Supp. 
2010)); W. VA. CODE §§ 44-6C-1 to -15 (LexisNexis 2004); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 881.01 
(West 2002 & Supp. 2009)); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 4-10-901 to -913 (2009). 
 109. Knight v. Comm’r, 552 U.S. 181, 185-86 (2008).  See also CONN. GEN. STAT. 
§§ 45a-541a to -541 (2008).     
 110. Knight, 552 U.S. at 189.  This “causation test” is the same test set forth by the 
Sixth Circuit in O’Neil.  See O’Neil v. Comm’r, 994 F.2d 302 (6th Cir. 1993), abrogated 
by Knight v. Comm’r, 128 S. Ct. 782 (2008).  
 111. Knight, 552 U.S. at 189.   
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with the Trustee’s fiduciary duties.”112 
The Commissioner, basing his arguments on Mellon Bank and 
Scott, argued that because investment advisory fees are commonly 
incurred by individual investors outside of trust administration, the 
fees did not meet the second requirement of section 67(e)(1).113   
The Tax Court, finding its initial interpretation of section 
67(e)(set forth in O’Neill v. Commissioner)114 and the ensuing decisions 
of the Federal and Fourth circuits to be sound, held that the 
deduction of the investment advisory fees were subject to the 2% 
floor.115  The taxpayers subsequently appealed.  
The Second Circuit, in a decision written by current Supreme 
Court Justice Sonia Sotomayor, went a step further in its 
interpretation of section 67(e) than either the Federal or Fourth 
Circuit.116  In its analysis, the Second Circuit agreed with the Fourth 
Circuit’s statement in Scott that the second prong of section 67(e)(1) 
does not ask whether the costs at issue are commonly incurred in the 
administration of trusts or are incurred as a result of a particular 
trustee’s fiduciary duty. It instead focused on the hypothetical 
situation where the assets are in the hands of an individual.117  It is at 
this point, however, that the court departs from its sister circuits.  The 
court disagreed with the Federal and Fourth circuits’ statement that 
costs “‘not customarily incurred outside of trusts’ are the ones not 
subject to the [2%] floor.”118  Instead, the court held that the plain 
meaning of section 67(e) “permits a trust to take a full deduction only 
for those costs that could not have been incurred by an individual 
property owner.”119   
In reaching this standard, the Second Circuit reached a result 
that had not been advanced by either party and was far more 
 
 112. Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 113. Rudkin Testamentary Trust v. Comm’r, 124 T.C. 304, 308 (2005).  The 
Commissioner also argued that “neither State law nor the governing trust instrument 
imposed a legal obligation on the fiduciary to obtain professional investment 
management services.”  Id. at 309.  This is an argument put forth in response to the 
question left unanswered by the Fourth Circuit in Scott v. United States, 328 F.3d 132 
(4th Cir. 2003), regarding the effect of state law on this issue.    
 114. 98 T.C. 227, 230–31 (1992).  
 115. Rudkin, 124 T.C. at 311.  
 116. Rudkin Testamentary Trust v. Comm’r, 467 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2006).  
 117. Id. at 155.  
 118. Id. at 156 (emphasis added) (quoting Mellon Bank, N.A. v. United States, 
265 F.3d 1275, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2001)).   
 119. Rudkin, 467 F.3d at 156.  The court also found the statute’s text to be clear 
and unambiguous and, therefore, refused to address the trustee’s legislative history 
arguments.  Id. at 157.  
14
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restrictive than the position asserted by the IRS.120 Following this 
holding, the taxpayer petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of 
certiorari, citing the clear conflict among the four circuits.121  The 
Department of Justice opposed certiorari, claiming that the conflict 
would soon be resolved by forthcoming regulations.122  Unconvinced 
by the Department of Justice’s claims, the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari under the name Knight v. Commissioner123 in June 2007.124  
C. Proposed Treasury Regulations: Treasury’s Attempt to Get Out in Front 
of the Supreme Court 
On July 27, 2007, just over a month after the Supreme Court 
granted certiorari to Rudkin, the IRS released proposed regulations 
under section 67(e).125  The proposed regulations stated that “[t]o 
the extent that a cost incurred by an estate or non-grantor trust is 
unique to such an entity, that cost is not subject to the 2-percent floor 
on miscellaneous itemized deductions.”126  The proposed regulations 
defined costs as “unique” if “an individual could not have incurred 
that cost in connection with property not held in an estate or trust.”127  
It is clear that the IRS was signaling to the Supreme Court their 
approval of the Second Circuit’s narrow “could not have been 
incurred” standard set forth by then-Judge Sotomayor.  
The proposed regulations set forth a non-exclusive list of certain 
products or services that the IRS considered “unique” and fully 
deductible.128 These products or services included:  
Fiduciary accountings; judicial or quasi-judicial filings 
required as part of the administration of the estate or trust; 
fiduciary income tax and estate tax returns; the division or 
distribution of income or corpus to or among beneficiaries; 
trust or will contest or construction; fiduciary bond 
premiums; and communications with beneficiaries 
regarding estate or trust matters.129   
 
 120. Jones, supra note 39, at 74.   
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. 552 U.S. 181 (2008).  
 124. Jones, supra note 39, at 74. 
 125. Section 67 Limitations on Estates and Trusts, 72 Fed. Reg. 41,243, 41,245 
(proposed July 27, 2007).  
 126. Id. 
 127. Id.  
 128. Id.  
 129. Id. 
15
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The IRS also set forth a non-exclusive list of non-unique products 
or services that are subject to the 2% floor.130  These non-unique 
products and services included: “Custody or management of property; 
advice on investing for total return; gift tax returns; the defense of 
claims by creditors of the decedent or grantor; and the purchase, sale, 
maintenance, repair, insurance or management of non-trade or 
business property.”131   
One example included in that list has been heavily debated: the 
inclusion of costs associated with the preparation of fiduciary income 
tax returns.  This issue will be discussed in more detail following the 
discussion of the Knight decision as the IRS may be forced to alter its 
position taken on this issue in light of the Supreme Court’s holding.  
In addition to setting forth the “unique” standard to test the 
deductibility of trust costs, the proposed regulations also touched on 
an issue that has been percolating in the background for much of this 
section 67 litigation and that has now become a very hot topic among 
corporate fiduciaries—that being how “bundled fees” are to be 
treated going forward.  The proposed regulations addressed the issue 
as follows:  
 (c) “Bundled fees.” If an estate or a non-grantor trust pays a 
single fee, commission or other expense for both costs that 
are unique to estates and trusts and costs that are not, then 
the estate or non-grantor trust must identify the portion (if 
any) of the legal, accounting, investment advisory, appraisal 
or other fee, commission or expense that is unique to estates 
and trusts and is thus not subject to the 2-percent floor.  The 
taxpayer must use any reasonable method to allocate the 
single fee, commission or expense between the costs unique 
to estates and trusts and other costs.132 
This has been a hot topic as most corporate fiduciaries do not 
charge separately for their services.133  Instead, most trustees bundle 
their services and charge a fee based on a percentage of the value of 
the trust assets.134  This bundled fee represents compensation for all 
fiduciary services, including acting as a custodian for the trust assets, 
investing the trust assets, filing the trust’s income tax returns, 
communicating with beneficiaries, and handling any necessary court 
 
 130. Id.   
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. RONALD D. AUCUTT, TRUSTS AND THE 2% FLOOR 10 (McGuire Woods L.L.P 
2008), http://www.mcguirewoods.com/news-resources/publications/taxation/trusts.pdf. 
 134. Id.   
16
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filings.135  Under the current practice, the bundled fiduciary fees are 
fully deductible.136  The effect of “unbundling” fiduciary fees will be 
discussed later in this article, but one can already imagine the 
potential challenges and substantial costs associated with requiring 
corporate fiduciaries to unbundle their fees and separate them into 
unique and non-unique expenses.    
IV. THE KNIGHT DECISION 
In an opinion written by Chief Justice John Roberts, the Supreme 
Court found in favor of the Commissioner but for different reasons 
than those given by the Court of Appeals.137  The Court initiated its 
analysis by reviewing the language of section 67(e).138  It immediately 
took issue with the Second Circuit’s application of the statute, as in 
the Second Circuit’s analysis the court asked whether the cost at issue 
could have been incurred by an individual.139  This, the Court found, 
“flies in the face of the statutory language” of section 67(e).140  The 
language of the statute does not ask whether the costs “could not have 
been incurred” were it not held in trust but instead asks whether the 
costs “would not have been incurred if the property were not held” in 
trust.141  The Court stated that “[t]he fact that an individual could not 
do something is one reason he would not, but not the only possible 
reason.”142  If Congress had intended the narrow application adopted 
by the Second Circuit, “it easily could have replaced ‘would’ in the 
statute with ‘could,’ and presumably would have.”143  The Court found 
this fact to be strong support for rejecting the Second Circuit’s 
interpretation of section 67(e).144 
 
 135. Id.  For example, under this proposed approach, if 30% of a trustee’s fee is 
allocable to fiduciary bonds and accountings, fiduciary income tax returns, and 
distributions and communications to beneficiaries, while 70% of the fee is allocable 
to custody, management, and investment advice, then only 30% of the fee will be fully 
deductible as an “above the line” expense [not subject to the 2% floor], and the 
other 70% will be deductible only to the extent it exceeds 2% of the trust’s equivalent 
of “adjusted gross income.”  Id. (alteration in original). 
 136. Notice 2008-32, 2008-11 I.R.B. 578, at 594. 
 137. Knight v. Comm’r, 552 U.S. 181, 183 (2008).  
 138. Id. at 187–88. 
 139. Id.  
 140. Id.   
 141. Id. at 188 (internal quotation omitted).  
 142. Id.  
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. The Court also went on to find that the Second Circuit’s interpretation of 
section 67(e) would render the first clause of Section 67(e)(1) superfluous.  Id. at 
188–89.  “If the only costs that are fully deductible are those that could not be 
17
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The Court also rejected the “causation test” for deductibility set 
forth by the trustee.145  This causation test, adopted from the Sixth 
Circuit’s opinion in O’Neil, sets forth the proposition that all fees 
incurred in connection with, or caused by, the trustee’s fiduciary 
duties are fully deductible and, therefore, not subject to the 2% 
floor.146  This interpretation, however, would allow nearly every cost 
incurred by a trustee to escape the 2% floor of section 67 because a 
trustee has a fiduciary duty to incur them.147   
Furthermore, the court found that the adoption of this causation 
test would render the second clause of section 67(e) superfluous.148  If 
section 67(e) set forth a straightforward causation test, then only the 
first clause of section 67(e)(1)—providing that the cost be “incurred 
in connection with the administration of the . . . trust” —would be 
necessary.149  The second clause of section 67(e)(1)—that the cost 
also be one “which would not have been incurred if the property were 
not held in such trust” —would be redundant and, ultimately, 
unnecessary.150  
After rejecting the trustee’s causation test approach, the Court 
moved on to introduce what it found as the correct approach to 
section 67(e).  Section 67(e), the Court found, invites a “hypothetical 
inquiry into the treatment of the property were it held outside a 
trust.”151  It is the “counterfactual question of whether individuals 
would have incurred such costs in the absence of a trust” that should 
 
incurred outside the trust context,” then there would be no reason to include an 
additional condition on full deductibility that the costs be incurred in connection 
with the trust’s administration.  Id. at 189. “We can think of no expense that could be 
incurred exclusively by a trust but would nevertheless not be ‘paid or incurred in 
connection with’ its administration.”  Id.  
 145. Id.   
 146. See O’Neill v. Comm’r, 994 F.2d 302, 304 (6th Cir. 1993).  
 147. Knight, 552 U.S. at 188. 
 148. Id. at 190.  
 149. Id.   
 150. Id.  In addition to rendering the second clause of section 67(e)(1) 
superfluous, the Court also found that the trustee’s position was “further 
undermined by [the Court’s] inclination, ‘[i]n construing provisions . . . in which a 
general statement of policy is qualified by an exception, [to] read the exception 
narrowly in order to preserve the primary operation of the provision.’”  Id.  (quoting 
Comm’r v. Clark, 489 U.S. 726, 739 (1989)).  The general rule set forth by section 
67(e) is that gross income of an estate or trust shall be computed in the same manner 
as an individual.  Id. at 191.  Under the trustee’s interpretation, the exception set 
forth in section 67(e)(1) would swallow the general rule as most, if not all, expenses 
incurred by a trust would be fully deductible.  Id.   
 151. Id.  
18
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be the focus of any section 67(e) analysis.152  This hypothetical 
counterfactual approach fits squarely with the test adopted by the 
Fourth and Federal circuits: “Costs incurred by trusts that escape the 
2% floor are those that would not ‘commonly’ or ‘customarily’ be 
incurred by individuals.”153 It is this test that the Court adopted for 
determining the tax deductibility of trust or estate expenses.154   
Having established the correct standard in which to approach 
section 67(e), the Court proceeded to address the particular issue of 
the case before them—“whether investment advisory fees incurred by 
a trust escape the 2% floor” of section 67.155  Consistent with the 
standard articulated above, the Court seemed to cut the trustee’s legs 
out from under him as it stated that the trustee, who had the burden 
of establishing his entitlement to the deduction, had failed to 
demonstrate that it is uncommon or unusual for individuals to hire an 
investment advisor.156  The foundation of the trustee’s argument was 
that “he engaged an investment adviser because of his fiduciary 
duties” to act as a prudent investor under Connecticut’s Uniform 
Prudent Investor Act.157  To satisfy the prudent investor standard, a 
 
 152. Id. (emphasis in original).   
 153. Id. (citing Scott v. United States, 328 F.3d 132, 140 (4th Cir. 2003) (“Put 
simply, trust-related administrative expenses are subject to the 2% floor if they 
constitute expenses commonly incurred by individual taxpayers.”); Mellon Bank, N.A. 
v. United States, 265 F.3d 1275, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (Section 67(e) “treats as fully 
deductible only those trust-related administrative expenses that are unique to the 
administration of a trust and not customarily incurred outside of trusts.”)). 
 154. Id.  Although the solicitor general advocated for the adoption of the Second 
Circuit’s “could not have been incurred” standard, he also accepted the Fourth and 
Federal circuits’ test as an alternative reading of section 67(e).  Id. at 188 n.3, 191. 
 155. Id. at 192.  
 156. Id. (citing INDOPCO, Inc. v. Comm’r, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992)(noting the 
“‘familiar rule’ that ‘an income tax deduction is a matter of legislative grace and that 
the burden of clearly showing the right to the claimed deduction is on the taxpayer’” 
(quoting Interstate Transit Lines v. Comm’r, 319 U.S. 590, 593 (1943)))).  The Court, 
however, subsequently acknowledged that the reason the trustee had not 
demonstrated this fact was because the trustee’s argument was not that individuals do 
not commonly incur investment advisory fees, but that individuals cannot incur trust 
investment advisory fees.  Id. at 193.  It seems odd that the Chief Justice would 
highlight the trustee’s failure to demonstrate this particular fact, and then provide an 
explanation for why it had not attempted to do so.  At first blush, it seems as though 
the Chief Justice may have been alluding to the fact that there is no difference 
between trust investment advisory fees and individual investment advisory fees.  
However, in the last paragraph of the opinion he acknowledges that it may be 
conceivable that some trust-related investment advisory fees may be fully deductible, 
and therefore different from individual investment advisory fees.  Id. at 194-95.  
Regardless of the dicta in the last paragraph, it seems that the Court is deferring to 
the IRS and the Treasury will make the final determination. 
 157. Id. at 193.  
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trustee “must ‘invest and manage trust assets as a prudent investor 
would, by considering the purposes, terms, distribution requirements 
and other circumstances of the trust.’”158  “[T]he standard looks to 
what a prudent investor with the same investment objectives handling 
his own affairs would do . . . .”159 
The Court did not doubt the trustee’s claim that a hypothetical 
prudent investor in the trustee’s position would have solicited 
investment advice.160  In fact, this claim seemed to further support the 
Court’s position, as it concluded:  
Having accepted all this, it is quite difficult to say that 
investment advisory fees ‘would not have been incurred’—
that is, that it would be unusual or uncommon for such fees 
to have been incurred—if the property were held by an 
individual investor with the same objectives as the Trust in 
handling his own affairs.161   
The Court did, however, leave open the possibility that “some 
trust-related investment advisory fees may be fully deductible ‘if an 
investment advisor were to impose a special, additional charge 
applicable only to its fiduciary accounts.’”162  It was found to be 
conceivable “that a trust may have an unusual investment objective, or 
may require a specialized balancing of the interests of various parties, 
such that a reasonable comparison with individual investors would be 
improper.”163  In this situation “the incremental cost of expert advice 
 
 158. Id. (quoting CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-541b(a) (2007)) (emphasis in original).  
 159. Id.   
 160. Id. at 193–94.  
 161. Id. at 194. 
 162. Id. (quoting Brief for the Respondent at 25, Knight v. Comm’r, No. 06-1286 
(U.S. Oct. 11, 2007)). 
 163. Id. at 194–95.  Theoretically this argument makes sense.  However, in 
practice, the balancing of interests between current income beneficiaries and 
remainder beneficiaries is not primarily done by the investment manager; instead 
they are balanced through the decisions made by the trust administrator.  The 
following is an example of this: Often, non-grantor trusts will have a named income 
beneficiary to whom the trustee is required to pay out 100% of the net income and 
principal (corpus) for certain expenses, but at the discretion of the trustee.  Such a 
trust will also have remainder beneficiaries who will receive the balance of the trust 
upon the death of the income beneficiary.  In such a situation, the income 
beneficiary may be an elder individual whose primary interest is income.  The trustee 
would then work with the investment manager to set up an appropriate investment 
objective for the trust which would both provide as much income as possible for the 
income beneficiary, but also provide some opportunity for growth for the remainder 
beneficiaries.  This is the balancing of interests that the Chief Justice was referring to.  
The problem with this example, however, is that the investment manager will simply 
assign an investment objective similar to that of an individual with the same goal—
20
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 3 [2010], Art. 11
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol36/iss3/11
 
2010] KNIGHT V. COMMISSIONER 1353 
beyond what would normally be required for the ordinary taxpayer 
would not be subject to the 2% floor.”164  In the present case, 
however, the Court found that the trustee had not asserted that the 
investment advisory services were distinctive and therefore the fees 
associated with these services were subject to the 2% floor of section 
67.165  
V. ANALYSIS OF THE KNIGHT DECISION 
A. Analysis 
When all is said and done, the Chief Justice did what he could 
with what is, at the end of the day, a terribly written code section.  In 
rejecting the Second Circuit’s interpretation of section 67(e), the 
Court found that “[i]f Congress had intended . . . [such a] reading, it 
easily could have replaced ‘would’ in the statute with ‘could,’ and 
presumably would have.” 166  The Court likely gives Congress too much 
credit.  In its brief to the Supreme Court, the Respondent concedes 
that “there is no meaningful discussion of Section 67(e)(1) itself in 
the legislative history.”167  This seems to make perfect sense as even 
some meaningful discussion or debate over the language of this section 
would have highlighted the interpretive problems that result from the 
inclusion of “would” in this code section and the possible problems 
associated with trustees applying a hypothetical counterfactual to 
determine the tax deductibility of certain trust expenses.  Regardless 
of the poor drafting of this particular section, the Court was right to 
restrain itself from making a judicial amendment of the statute.168   
Instead, the Court adopted the standard applied by the Fourth 
and Federal circuits.169  At first glance, this standard seems to 
 
that being a majority focus on income production with a slight equity holding for 
growth.  Investment industry standards do not provide for specific fiduciary, interest 
balancing, investment objectives utilized by investment advisors.  Instead, the 
balancing of different beneficiaries’ interests is primarily done by the trustee who 
helps establish a particular investment objective and makes discretionary decisions for 
how principal distributions will be made.   
 164. Id. at 195. 
 165. Id.    
 166. Id. at 182. 
 167. Brief for the Respondent at 33, Knight v. Comm’r, No. 06-1286 (U.S. Oct. 11, 
2007).  
 168. Knight, 552 U.S. at 194 (“Congress’s decision to phrase the pertinent inquiry 
in terms of a prediction about a hypothetical situation inevitably entails some 
uncertainty, but that is no excuse for judicial amendment of the statute.”). 
 169. Id. at 191. 
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articulate a middle ground between the standard adopted by the 
Second Circuit (supported by the IRS) and the standard advocated by 
the trustee.  However, upon further review, the narrow standard 
adopted by the Second Circuit and the moderate standard adopted by 
the Court will likely have the same practical effect on what trust 
expenses are found to be subject to the 2% floor.  
The “could not have been incurred” standard advanced by the 
IRS is clearly the narrowest interpretation of section 67(e).  This 
interpretation would allow only costs which are unique to trust and 
estate administration—and unable to be incurred by individuals 
holding similar assets—to be fully deductible.  The fact that the IRS 
advanced this interpretation should be of no surprise as this position 
would limit the number of deductions, thereby yielding higher tax 
revenue.   
The causation test advocated by the trustee, on the other hand, is 
as broad a standard as can be applied to questions of tax deductibility.  
This test would allow any expense incurred by the trust to be fully 
deductible if the expense could be shown to result from the trustee’s 
fiduciary duties.  The Court was correct in its criticism of the trustee’s 
position170 because nearly every trust expense is incurred as the result 
of some fiduciary duty of the trustee.  Adoption of this test would 
allow nearly every trust expense to escape the 2% floor of section 67.   
In the middle lay the “not commonly or customarily incurred” 
standard adopted by the Supreme Court.171 After reading the Chief 
Justice’s opinion, this standard would seem to allow more to escape 
the 2% floor than that of the Second Circuit’s standard, but would 
also limit expenses not unique to trust administration to those not 
commonly or customarily incurred by individuals, which is a narrower 
scope than that of the causation test.  Herein lies the problem.  In 
practice there are very few expenses incurred by non-grantor trusts 
that are not unique to trust administration and that are also not 
commonly or customarily incurred by individuals holding the same or 
similar assets.  The only expenses likely to fall into this category are 
those associated with the services of specialty asset managers.  
Specialty asset managers are responsible for the administration 
and management of non-financial assets held in trusts.  Examples of 
specialty assets that fall outside the classification of standard financial 
assets are real estate, closely held business interests, farm/ranch 
 
 170. See id. at 189–91. 
 171. See id. at 191. 
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property, and oil, gas, and mineral interests.172  Non-grantor trusts 
with corporate fiduciaries as named trustees commonly use specialty 
asset managers to handle these types of assets.  The expenses 
associated with the services of specialty asset managers are different 
from trust administration fees as they are not incurred as the result of 
the asset being held in trust.  Instead, they are more akin to 
investment advisory fees as they are typically incurred as the result of 
the fiduciary duty of the trustee.  Unlike investment advisory fees, 
specialty asset management fees are not necessarily commonly or 
customarily incurred by individuals who hold the same or similar 
assets.   
For example, a non-grantor trust being managed by a corporate 
trustee that holds an interest in a closely-held business will often have 
a specialty asset manager or business advisor handle any number of 
issues related to the closely-held business such as business valuation, 
succession planning, asset management, or even sales services.  Would 
these specialty asset manager/business advisory fees be fully 
deductible under the standard set forth in Knight?  On the one hand, 
they are not trust specific expenses, but on the other hand, they are 
not nearly as commonly incurred as investment advisory fees, for 
example.  This would seem to be the uncommon example of a fee 
that would be subject to the 2% floor under the Second Circuit’s 
standard, yet would be fully deductible under the standard adopted in 
Knight.  
Under the current common practice, however, the trust’s 
fiduciary income tax preparer would not even conduct this analysis 
because most specialty asset management fees are bundled into one 
fee along with the trust administration and investment advisory fees.173  
If trustees are not required to unbundle their trust management fees, 
then the practical outcome of the standard adopted in Knight will be 
no different than the narrow standard advocated by the IRS.  It 
logically follows that, in order to effectuate the goals of the standard 
 
 172. See J.P. Morgan, Specialty asset management, http://www.jpmorgan.com/
pages/jpmorgan/private_banking/foundations/specialty_asset_management (last 
visited Apr. 11, 2010); Wells Fargo, Real Estate & Specialty Assets, 
https://www.wellsfargo.com/investing/pcs/business/assets (last visited Apr. 11, 
2010). 
 173. See Wells Fargo Investment Management & Trust Fee Schedule (Effective 
Date Oct. 2006)(on file with author).  It is important to note that corporate trustees 
who utilize this type of bundled fee typically reserve the right to charge special fees 
for extraordinary services—beyond or in place of the bundled fee—resulting from 
the management of these specialty assets.  Id. at 2. 
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adopted by the Court in Knight, the Department of the Treasury 
must—to the dismay of all corporate fiduciaries—issue finalized 
regulations requiring some form of unbundling trust management 
fees.  This is a logical conclusion to reach after analyzing the different 
standards articulated by each court and applying them to the practical 
aspects of trust administration.   
There is, however, another possible conclusion that one can 
reach with regard to the language of section 67(e)(1).  To reach this 
conclusion, one must take a step back and disregard the legal 
arguments set forth by each side above and read the following passage 
as an individual with no legal training would:  
[T]he deductions for costs which are paid or incurred in 
connection with the administration of . . . the trust and 
which would not have been incurred if the property were 
not held in such trust . . . shall be treated as allowable in 
arriving at adjusted gross income.174 
Is it possible that the “which would not have been incurred if the 
property were held in such trust” clause of section 67(e)(1) has been 
overstated by parties and courts as a “second prong” of a statutory 
test?175  With the acknowledged absence of any Congressional intent 
to establish such a statutory test, it seems entirely possible that this 
“second prong” is nothing more than a completion of the overall 
thought of a relationship to trust administration.176  But faced with 
diverging circuit court standards, the Supreme Court was forced to 
make sense of a senseless statute.  And instead of judicially amending 
the statute itself, the Court adopted a standard which, in the end, 
affords the Treasury substantial latitude in its application.  This 
latitude exists in the Treasury’s ability to define what constitutes 
“common” and “customary” in its regulations to section 67.   
Some commentators argue that by adopting this standard, the 
Court simply added to the confusion surrounding the exception 
rather than clarifying its application.177  Instead, the Court’s position 
can be interpreted as simply laying out the boundaries of the 
Treasury’s future regulations.  The Treasury and IRS now have an 
opportunity to step back from the proposed regulations released in 
July 2007 and work on articulating an application of the statute, 
 
 174. I.R.C. § 67(e)(1) (2010). 
 175. AUCUTT, supra note 133, at 19.  
 176. Id.    
 177. Lindsay Roshkind, Interpreting I.R.C. § 67(E): The Supreme Court’s Attempt to 
Nail Investment Advisory Fees to the “Floor,” 60 FLA. L. REV. 961, 970 (2008).  
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consistent with the fairly broad guidance provided in the Knight 
opinion. This course of action is fair, cost-effective, and 
administratively feasible for the IRS and fiduciaries alike.   
B. IRS and Treasury Interim Guidance 
On February 27, 2008, following the decision in Knight, the IRS 
issued Notice 2008-32, which provided interim guidance on the 
treatment of investment advisory fees under section 67.178  The Notice 
extended a grace period in which taxpayers would not be required to 
unbundle fiduciary fees for any taxable years beginning before 
January 1, 2008.179  In addition to extending this grace period, the 
Notice also requested that comments be submitted by interested 
parties.180 
Many comments were filed in response to the Treasury’s 
request.181  Generally, these comments asserted that the unbundling 
of fiduciary fees should not be required182 and, in any event, that the 
 
 178. Notice 2008-32, 2008-11 I.R.B. 593. 
 179. Id. at 594. 
 180. Id.   
 181. Roy M. Adams, Coping With Change—Like It or Not, 17TH ANN. EST. & 
CHARITABLE GIFT PLAN. INST., Sept. 14, 2009, at 71.  
 182. Id. The Committee on Estate and Gift Taxation of the New York City Bar 
Association also took the following positions:  
  1. The Proposed Regulations’ requirement that bundled fees be 
unbundled should be eliminated as it is contrary to Section 67(e) and the 
view expressed by each of the federal courts that have commented on the 
deductibility of trustees’ fees.  
  2.  If, however, the Service is not inclined to eliminate its unbundling 
requirement, then a trust or estate should be allowed to deduct without 
regard to the 2% floor the portion of its bundled fiduciary fee that would 
not be commonly incurred by individuals, as determined based upon the 
fiduciary’s books and records and using any reasonable method of 
allocation that the fiduciary may select.  The fiduciary’s determination may 
take into account the exceptions set forth near the end of the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Knight, including for special additional charges that are 
applicable only to fiduciary accounts, and the incremental cost of expert 
advice beyond what would normally be incurred by individuals.  
  3.  As an alternative to providing allocations based upon its books and 
records, a fiduciary should also be allowed a safe harbor to deduct without 
regard to the 2% floor the greater of [A] the amount of the total fiduciary 
commissions that would be allowed under the applicable state statute 
governing the commissions of individual fiduciaries, [B] a specified 
percentage of the fiduciary commissions (such as 50%) to be determined by 
the Service, and [C] the amount of the allocations to fully deductible costs 
based upon the fiduciary’s generally applicable published fee schedule. 
Id. at 71–72. 
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IRS should provide guidance to clarify that neither taxpayers nor tax 
practitioners will be subject to penalties relating to 2% floor issues 
unless the taxpayer’s position has no realistic possibility of being 
sustained on its merits.183   
The comments against the proposed regulations’ unbundling 
requirement differentiated unitary (bundled) fees from the 
investment advisory fees—those which were found to be subject to 
the 2% floor in Knight—by arguing that the unitary fees were simply 
fiduciary fees, which have always been held to be fully deductible184 
and, in what seems to be a throwaway argument, that nothing in the 
Court’s opinion in Knight, or in section 67(e) itself, specifically 
requires unbundling.  Advocates of this position point to the fact that 
fiduciary income tax return preparer fees are fully deductible under 
section 67(e), whereas individual tax return preparer fees are subject 
to the 2% floor.185  But is it really enough to say that these fees are 
unique because the fiduciary must file a Form 1041 but an individual 
must file a Form 1040?  Although the Supreme Court did not focus on 
preparer fees in Knight, the justices expressed some trepidation about 
this line of reasoning during oral arguments in that case.186  Justice 
 
 183. Id. at 72.  Significant changes to tax return preparer penalties were made 
when Congress enacted the Small Business and Work Opportunity Act of 2007.  
Specifically, the new standard requires that a tax return position be disclosed unless 
there is ‘reasonable belief that the [filing] position would more likely than not be 
sustained on its merits.’  This is a fairly significant step up in comparison to the 
previous ‘good faith’ standard.  See Craig L. Janes, Between Monsters—The Section 67(e) 
Prop. Regs. And Section 6694, 35 EST. PLAN. 19 (2008).  
 184. Adams & Hoyt, supra note 181, at 72.  
 185. Craig L. Janes, supra note 183, at 19. 
 186. The Court did not address deductibility of fiduciary tax preparation fees in 
the opinion, but the issue was discussed in oral arguments.  See Knight v. Comm’r, 552 
U.S. 181 (2008).  The following is an excerpt from oral arguments in which Justice 
Souter addressed attorney Eric Miller, an assistant to the Solicitor General, who 
represented the IRS:  
  JUSTICE SOUTER:  Yes, but it’s the individual who has to file the 1040.  
What the trustee is filing is the 1041.  And—I was going to ask the same 
question that Justice Alito did, and that is why do you place so much 
significance either in the label, i.e., it’s fiduciary return, or in peculiar fact 
that it is a fiduciary who is filing that return? 
  It’s a tax return and—and I think your—the government’s argument is 
that with respect to—to other items that may be disputed, you should 
regard them at a fairly general level, i.e., investment advice, not fiduciary 
investment advice.  But when you come to the tax return, you don’t regard 
it as a general—at a general level; you regard it at a very specific level, i.e., a 
fiduciary tax return.  It seems to me that the government with respect to the 
tax return is doing exactly what it criticizes the taxpayer for doing with 
respect to investment advice.  And I don’t understand the distinction.  
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Souter seemed to take issue with the government’s position that 
fiduciary income tax return preparer fees are fully deductible yet 
investment advisory fees incurred by a fiduciary are not.187  Chief 
Justice Roberts pointed out the possible effects of this distinction 
while discussing how a “customary” or “common” standard would be 
applied.  He suggested that if the above logic were followed, 
investment advisors would simply self-label themselves as “fiduciary 
advisors,” which would allow their fees to be fully deductible by the 
trusts they advise.188  
Justice Souter highlighted what will likely be the major issue that 
the IRS and Treasury must address: how will the regulations define 
what is “customary” and what is “common?”  If defined narrowly, 
fiduciary income tax return preparer fees and fiduciary investment 
advisory fees are not customarily or commonly incurred merely 
because individuals do not incur “fiduciary” fees and expenses.  If 
 
Transcript of Oral Argument at 31–32, Knight, 552 U.S. 181 (No. 06-1286).  
 187. Id.   
 188. See id. at 39–40.  The following is an excerpt from oral arguments of a 
discussion between Chief Justice Roberts and Eric D. Miller, Esq., an assistant to the 
Solicitor General, who represented the I.R.S.:  
  CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS:  So how does your customary or commonly 
incurred test work?  Let’s say you have two trusts, one $10 million, the other 
[$]10,000.  I think an individual with $10 million might well seek investment 
advice, but an individual with only [$]10,000 might decide it’s not worth it.  
Would you have a different application of the 2 percent rule for those two 
trusts?  
  MR. MILLER:  I think if the test is whether—whether the individuals 
would have—would commonly ordinarily incur that cost, I think one might 
well look at that because the comparison would be individuals with similar 
assets, and, as Your Honor knows, there might be a difference depending 
on the size.  
  CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: How many—how many individuals do you 
need?  Let’s say it’s $3 million in the trust, and we think maybe 60 percent 
of people would hire an investment advisor; 40 percent would think they 
can do just as well on their own.  Is that customarily incurred by individuals?  
  MR. MILLER: I think it might well be enough that—for something that 
the Service could clarify through— 
  CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS:  Your answer to both questions is “might 
well be,” and that’s a fairly vague line when it comes to taxes.  
  MR. MILLER:  The— 
  JUSTICE SCALIA:  And whatever line you—you pick, I guarantee you, 
trusts are going to break themselves up into mini-trusts that fall under the 
line.  I mean people aren’t stupid. (Laughter.)  
  CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS:  Or, even worse, advisors are going to 
break themselves up into different advisors.  There’s going to be somebody 
who says I’m a fiduciary advisor whenever a trustee calls, but, I’m a normal 
advisor, when it’s an individual.   
See id.  
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defined from a broader perspective, income tax return preparer fees 
and investment advisory fees are fees commonly incurred by 
individuals, and are therefore subject to the 2% floor.189  
It seems as though the IRS and Treasury will be forced to choose 
between these two perspectives on what constitutes “common” or 
“customary.”  And, after completing the above analysis, it seems likely 
that the IRS and Treasury will adopt the broad perspective because 
the narrow perspective seems to mirror the causation test rejected by 
the Court in Knight.  If a broad perspective is taken with regard to the 
“common or customary” standard, the treatment of fiduciary income 
tax preparer fees will have to be changed as a result.  Unless the IRS 
can articulate how exactly the preparation of a fiduciary income tax 
return is sufficiently unique as opposed to fiduciary investment 
management fees, the fees associated with preparing a fiduciary 
income tax return should be subject to the 2% floor.  A major risk of 
adopting too broad of an approach to this standard is that it could 
completely emasculate the exception Congress enacted, unless 
Congress stepped up to remedy the situation by clarifying such a 
poorly written statute.190 
In any event, with regard to the bundled fees, the IRS and 
Treasury should take into consideration the fact that this fee structure 
is welcomed by most grantors and beneficiaries alike.191  Although the 
unbundling of a fiduciary’s fee “may be a superficially appropriate 
way to encourage similar treatment of similar taxpayers, it would 
operate imperfectly in the marketplace of negotiated fee struc-
tures . . . and it would represent one more administrative burden in 
conflict with Congress’s stated purposes” of section 67—efficiency 
and ease of administration.192 
The IRS and Treasury have yet to release finalized regulations to 
this section.  Although Notice 2008-32 stated that “final regulations 
under [Section] 1.67-4 [would] be published without delay”193 after 
the noted comment period, the IRS and Treasury subsequently 
released Notice 2008-116, which extended the grace period under the 
 
 189. See id. at 31–32. 
 190. Robert S. Balter & Jonathan G. Blattmachr, Knight v. Comr.: The Two Percent 
Floor and a Fiduciary’s Investment Advisory Fees, 49 TAX MGM’T MEMO. 155, 171 n.94 
(2008) (comparing GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 180 (1909) (“It is not 
as speedy or as simple a process to interpret a statute out of existence as to repeal it, 
but with time and patient skill, it can often be done.”)).  
 191. AUCUTT, supra note 133, at 20.   
 192. Id. 
 193. Notice 2008-32, 2008-11 I.R.B. 578 at 594. 
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previous Notice to include taxable years beginning in 2008.194  Notice 
2008-116 has since been modified and superseded by Notice 2010-32, 
which again extended the grace period to taxable years beginning 
before January 1, 2010.195    
C. Safe Harbors  
In light of the Supreme Court’s holding in Knight, many 
commentators have suggested that Treasury consider adopting safe 
harbors from unbundling.196  One option, for example, is that “the 
proposed unbundling obligation should apply only to amounts that 
are substantial and significant—and fundamentally that means only to 
investment advisory fees and security custody fees.”197  In most cases these 
are the largest and most significant expenses incurred by fiduciaries.198   
The use of safe harbors is seen by some as a simplification for tax 
reporting purposes.199  But even if the unbundling requirement is 
limited to investment advisory fees and security custody fees, for 
example, the fundamental problem of unbundling remains: 
“[U]nbundling each telephone call, meeting, letter, note and memo, 
not to mention emails, into their respective constituent phrases and 
subject matters, and then into each one’s allocable portions of the 
costs . . . is not practicable and will be extraordinarily burdensome if 
not absolutely impossible.”200  
Others view safe harbors in yet a different light.  Some feel that 
safe harbors would merely serve as a “complication for fiduciaries, 
who—as with many elections under the tax law—would be compelled 
by fiduciary duty to calculate the outcome both under the safe harbor 
and under a more customized ‘reasonable method’ that might be 
more favorable to the beneficiaries.”201   
In addition to being seen as a simplification for tax reporting 
purposes, safe harbors may also serve as an alternative to requiring the 
Treasury to clearly articulate what constitutes “common” or 
“customary,” as set forth in Knight.  This alternative, however, is the 
source of some suspicion as it is seen “as an unsettling sign that 
 
 194. Notice 2008-116, 2008-52 I.R.B. 1351 at 1357.  
 195. Notice 2010-32, 2010-15 I.R.B. 594 at 594. 
 196. Balter & Blattmachr, supra note 190, at 168.  
 197. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 198. Id.   
 199. See AUCUTT, supra note 133, at 23. 
 200. Balter & Blattmachr, supra note 190, at 168.   
 201. AUCUTT, supra note 133, at 23.  
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Treasury and the [IRS] are not open to more bold, comprehensive, 
and simplifying exceptions for fiduciaries that would make safe 
harbors unnecessary . . . .” 202  Regardless of the noted deficiencies, the 
adoption of safe harbors is a distinct possibility, as their potential use 
was signaled in Notice 2008-32 when it stated that “[t]he final 
regulations may contain one or more safe harbors for the allocation 
of fees and expenses between those costs that are subject to the 2-
percent floor and those that are not.”203  
VI. CONCLUSION 
The estate planning and wealth management community had 
high expectations when the Supreme Court granted certiorari in the 
Knight case.  These expectations were rooted in the fact that for more 
than twenty years, since the adoption of section 67, trustees were 
unsure as to how the 2% floor applied to certain fiduciary fees and 
expenses.  The Supreme Court took on the case to resolve a long-
running conflict among federal appeals courts.  There was hope that 
the Supreme Court would settle this conflict and establish a bright-
line rule by which both the IRS and trustees would be able to 
determine with certainty which fiduciary expenses would be fully 
deductible and which expenses would be subject to the 2% floor.  
The opinion, while logical and well written, did little to clarify the 
confusion which surrounds section 67(e).  Instead, the Supreme 
Court seemed content in setting the boundaries within which the IRS 
and Treasury would be allowed to make their own clarification—
specifically, what constitutes “common” or “customarily.”  This 
clarification, however, has yet to be made.  In issuing the final 
regulations, the IRS and Treasury should avoid setting forth a rule 
that would require a case-by-case analysis of each and every fiduciary 
fee or expense.  Instead, they should issue a bright-line rule that is 
cost-effective and reasonable to administer for both fiduciaries and for 
the IRS.   
Given the language of section 67(e), establishing this bright-line 
rule is easier said than done.  Depending on the success that the IRS 
and Treasury have with setting forth this rule, the next logical step is 
for Congress to address the poorly written statute.  This process, 
however, may take longer than the two decades it took courts to 
address this issue.  But until Congress inserts itself into this process, 
 
 202. Id.   
 203. Notice 2008-32, 2008-11 I.R.B. 578 at 594. 
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trustees will wait patiently in tax law limbo for the finalized 
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